UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-7-2019

Hanks v. Idaho Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 46435

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"Hanks v. Idaho Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 46435" (2019). Not Reported. 5635.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/5635

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
10/7/2019 8:18 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

MELVIN DEAN HANKS,
Petitioner-Appellant,

SUPREME COURT NO. 46435-2018

vs.
MINIDOKA COUNTY NO.
CV-2016-932
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT MELVIN DEAN HANKS

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

HONORABLE JONATHAN P. BRODY
District Judge

ROBYN FYFFE, ISB# 7063
Fyffe Law, LLC
800 W. Main St., Ste. 1460
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 338-5231
robyn@fyffelaw.com
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONERAPPELLANT MELVIN DEAN HANKS

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Idaho Attorney General
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83 720
(208) 334-4534
ecf@ag.idaho.gov
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Table of Authorities ............................................................................................................ ii

II.

Argument in Reply ............................................................................................................. 1

A.
There is An Issue of Material Fact Regarding the Duration of Mr. Hanks'
"Determinate" Life Term ................................................................................................................. 1
B.

Judicial Estoppel Does Not Apply .......................................................................... .4

C.
This Court Should Construe the Ambiguity in the Record to Avoid an Eighth
Amendment Violation ..................................................................................................................... 8
III.

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 11

I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) ......................................................................................... 8
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) .................................................................................... 8
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) ......................................................................................... 8
STATE CASES
A & J Constr. Co. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 116 P.3d 12 (2005) ...................................................... 5
Hanks v. State, 121 Idaho 153, 823 P.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1992) ................................................... .4, 6
Hoagland v. Ada Cty., 154 Idaho 900, 303 P.3d 587 (2013) ........................................................... 5
Idaho State Bar v. Tway, 128 Idaho 794,919 P.2d 323 (1996) .................................................... 6-7
Matter ofTway, 123 Idaho 59, 62, 844 P.2d 688, 691 (1992) ........................................................ 6
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992) ............................................................... 2
Schultz v. State, 159 Idaho 486,362 P.3d 561 (Ct. App. 2015) ....................................................... 7
State v. Bagshaw, 137 Idaho 613, 51 P.3d 427 (Ct. App. 2002) ...................................................... 9
State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 428, 776 P.2d 424, 437 (1989) ............................................... 8-9
State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992) .................................................................. .10
State v. Burnham, 115 Idaho 730, 769 P.2d 607 (Ct. App. 1989) .................................................. 10
State v. Dowalo, 122 Idaho 761, 838 P.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1992) ...................................................... 9
State v. Estes, 120 Idaho 953,821 P.2d 1008 (Ct. App. 1991) ..................................................... .10
State v. Helms, 143 Idaho 79, 137 P.3d 466 (Ct. App. 2006) ....................................................... 11
State v. Hoffman, 111 Idaho 966, 729 P.2d 441 (Ct. App. 1986) .................................................... .3
State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 939 P.2d 1372 (1997) ............................................................... 11
State v. Lenwai, 122 Idaho 258, 833 P.2d 116 (Ct. App. 1992) ....................................................... 9
State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 788 P.2d 863 (Ct. App. 1990) ....................................................... 10
State v. Martinez, 122 Idaho 193, 832 P.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1992) ................................................. 9
State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 844 P.2d 1364 (Ct. App. 1992) ................................................ 9
State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210,953 P.2d 650 (Ct. App. 1998) ..................................................... 10
State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 11 P.3d 494 (Ct. App. 2000) ......................................................... 9
State v. Shanahan, 165 Idaho 343,445 P.3d 152 (2019) ................................................................ 5
State v. Soto, 121 Idaho 53, 822 P.2d 572 (Ct. App. 1991) ........................................................... 10
State v. Spurgeon, 107 Idaho 173, 687 P.2d 17 (Ct. App. 1984) .................................................. .10
State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 800, 992 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1999) ...................................................... 9
State v. Weaver, 135 Idaho 5, 13 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................................................ 9
State v. Wilson, 105 Idaho 669, 672 P.2d 237 (Ct. App. 1983) ................................................... .2-3
State v. Wilson,107 Idaho 506, 690 P.2d 1338 (1984) ................................................................. .2-3
State v. Wolverton, 120 Idaho 559, 817 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1991) .............................................. 10

11

II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

There is An Issue of Material Fact Regarding the Duration of Mr. Hanks'
"Determinate" Life Term
Sentencing laws were in in flux when the district court sentenced Melvin Hanks in 1984

and many prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges believed that "determinate life" meant either
parole or discharge after 30 years. Mr. Hanks, his family and attorney all believed the
determinate life term would be less than Mr. Hanks' natural life. No transcript was prepared of
the proceeding because Mr. Hanks' trial counsel - William J. Tway -

did not appeal the

sentence. Nor did Mr. Hanks have reason to appeal a fixed life term at that time - as reflected by
a different attorney's statements seeking a sentence reduction under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, Mr.
Hanks continued to believe his "determinate" life term was 30 years and asked the district court
to reduce his sentence to an "indeterminate" life term to allow for release within 15 years.
Mr. Hanks' position in the Rule 3 5 motion and the prevalent confusion in the legal
community regarding the duration of a "determinate life term" corroborate Mr. Hanks' sister's
recollection that the district court did not intend for Mr. Hanks to die in prison. In response, the
state circularly argues that no issue of fact exists regarding the duration of Mr. Hanks'
"determinate" life sentence because the conviction and commitment refer to a "determinate" life
sentence. Respondent's Brief, p. 7-8. The issue is not whether the district court used the term
"determinate" but, rather, whether the district court sentenced Mr. Hanks to die in prison with no
chance of parole when it imposed a "determinate" life term in October 1984.
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The state notes that the district court indicated Mr. Hanks' assumption that his
determinate life term was for 30 years was not supported by the record in denying Mr. Hanks'
Rule 35 motion a year after sentencing. Respondent's Brief, p. 8. In light of this indication, the
state argues the "record" disproves Mr. Hanks' claim that the district court imposed a sentence
for less than Mr. Hanks' natural life. Id.
However, the district court's memory- especially a year after the sentencing- is not
the "record" of what occurred at Mr. Hanks' sentencing hearing. See Matthews v. State, 122
Idaho 801, 807-08, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221-22 (1992) (error for the district court to base its
decision on judicial notice of the judge's personal recollection of events in the criminal
proceeding). Without a transcript or recording of the sentencing hearing, there is no "record" to
clearly disprove the sister's understanding that the life sentence fell short of natural life.
The state also notes that the Court of Appeals disproved of the theory that "determinate"
life meant 30 years several months before Mr. Hanks' sentencing in State v. Wilson, 105 Idaho
669, 672 P.2d 237 (Ct. App. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 107 Idaho 506, 690 P.2d 1338
(1984). Respondent's Brief, p. 7-8. Of course, the Court of Appeals' opinion never became final
and the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in Wilson after Mr. Hanks' sentencing.
According to the state, the attorneys and prosecutor in Wilson represented an anomaly
who had fallen prey to a "false conversion fallacy." Respondent's Brief, p. 7-8. However, the
appellate court's repudiation of the theory that "determinate" life meant 30 years does not negate
the fact that the belief was prevalent in the legal community when Mr. Hanks was sentenced.
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Indeed, in Wilson, the Court of Appeals noted the district court venerable Edward J Lodge -

none other than the

"did not express a view" on the definition of determinate life and,

in "his post-sentencing letter to the Attorney General, he urged that the duration of a fixed 'life'
sentence be clarified." Wilson, 105 Idaho at 675, 672 P.2d at 243. The Court reasoned "the view
apparently has evolved that a life sentence means thirty years and that a person sentenced to a
fixed life sentence will be eligible for release-outright or on parole-after thirty years" arose
from language in several Idaho Supreme Court decisions." Id.
That the Court of Appeals published its holding "that the duration of such a sentence is
the full natural life of the inmate" belies the state's argument that the parties' belief in that case
was isolated. See id. at 675-76, 672 P.2d at 243--44. Indeed, varying interpretations of
determinate life were common as sentencing statutes were being amended. See also State v.

Hoffman, 111 Idaho 966, 967, 729 P.2d 441, 442 (Ct. App. 1986) (use of "fixed indeterminate"
language at the first sentencing reflected judge's belief that the statutes divided fixed sentences
into a category of "fixed determinate" over which the Commission of Pardons and Parole had no
commutation power and "fixed indeterminate" sentence over which the commission would have
the power of commutation).
While there is no dispute the district court imposed a sentence labeled "determinate life,"
Mr. Hanks' sister and the limited record establish an issue of fact as to whether the determinate
life term pronounced during his sentencing hearing on October 11, 1984 was one that carried the
possibility of parole. The absence of any official recording of the sentencing hearing cannot be
held against Mr. Hanks without violating due process as protected by the Fourteenth
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Amendment. Accordingly, this Court should vacate the judgment dismissing his petition and
remand for further proceedings.

B.

Judicial Estoppel Does Not Apply
On January 28, 1985, an attorney filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion asking the

district court to reduce Mr. Hanks' sentence to "indeterminate life," which would increase access
to rehabilitative programs because he would be paroled within 10 years. R. 51-53. Mr. Hanks'
attorney argued that since a determinate life sentence would result in Mr. Hanks' release within
30 years, it made sense to allow him access to programming sooner rather than later. R. 51. On
January 8, 1986, the district court indicated it opinion that the determinate life term meant Mr.
Hanks' natural life and declined to reduce the sentence.
Four years later, on August 24, 1990, Mr. Hanks signed an affidavit drafted by an
attorney in support of his post-conviction relief action that averred that he was ineligible for
rehabilitation and training with a determinate life sentence because he was not eligible for
consideration for parole. R. 336. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the petition as dismissed as untimely without considering the claims' merits. Hanks v. State, 121
Idaho 153, 154-55, 823 P.2d 187, 188-89 (Ct. App. 1992).
According to the state, Mr. Hanks' argument that the district court pronounced a 30 year
sentence when it imposed "determinate" life in October 1984 is somehow incompatible with his
acknowledgement that the prison treated the sentence as one without a full term release date by
denying rehabilitative opportunities. The state thus claims the district court should have applied
judicial estoppel.
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However, judicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position,
then subsequently seeking a second position that is incompatible with the first. Hoagland v. Ada

Cty., 154 Idaho 900, 912, 303 P.3d 587, 599 (2013). The policy behind judicial estoppel is to
prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the legal system thereby protecting the integrity
of the judicial system. Hoagland, 154 Idaho at 912,303 P.3d at 599; A & J Constr. Co. v. Wood,
141 Idaho 682, 685, 116 P.3d 12, 16 (2005).
Initially, Mr. Hanks' understanding of the duration of the determinate life sentence
pronounced at his sentencing hearing in 1984 is not incompatible with acknowledging that the
prison treated his sentence as one of his natural life in 1990. Mr. Hanks' argument that a sentence
to die in prison was unconstitutional is consistent and not incompatible his belief the district
court intended to grant the opportunity for parole with its "determinate" life term. No court has
addressed the merits of Mr. Hanks' challenge to his sentence. Cf State v. Shanahan, 165 Idaho
343, 445 P.3d 152, 163 (2019) (holding Eighth Amendment claim foreclosed by the doctrine of
res judicata because argument was in substance a reiteration of earlier argument before the
sentencing court and the Court of Appeals). Moreover, contrary to the state's suggestion, Mr.
Hanks did not ask the district court to construe his determinate life term as 30 years in the Rule
35. Rather, Mr. Hanks took that fact as a given and used it as the springboard for his arguments
in support of an "indeterminate" life term.
And applying judicial estoppel in this case would fail to further the underlying policy to
prevent fast and loose behavior, at least on the part of criminal defendants. Six years after Mr.
Hanks was sentenced, on September 18, 1992, the Idaho Supreme Court suspended the attorney
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representing Mr. Hanks at sentencing -

Mr. Tway -

from the practice of law for two years for

making misleading statements to a court during a probation revocation proceedings and for
misapplying client trust funds. Matter ofTway, 123 Idaho 59, 62, 844 P.2d 688, 691 (1992).
While those disciplinary proceedings were pending, in summer 1992, Mr. Tway deceived clients
regarding the applicable statute of limitations, the status of their case and the location of their
trust funds. Idaho State Bar v. Tway, 128 Idaho 794, 796, 919 P.2d 323, 325 (1996). In that case,
Mr. Tway failed to conduct minimal legal research regarding the statute of limitations and then
misdirected his clients regarding the status. Tway, 128 Idaho at 796, 919 P.2d at 325.
The Bar recommended that Mr. Tway be disbarred because he was already under
suspension for similar misconduct, some of the charged acts occurred while he was being
prosecuted in the first disciplinary case, he refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his
conduct, he demonstrated indifference toward making restitution to previous misappropriation
victims, and he lied during a deposition taken in the course of the earlier prosecution which
deceit concealed the fact of the present misappropriation. Tway, 128 Idaho at 797, 919 P.2d at
326. The Court noted the misconduct "appears to have been part of an ongoing pattern of
misconduct which this Court has already addressed" and imposed the maximum suspension of
five years pursuant. Tway, 128 Idaho at 799, 919 P.2d at 328.
Rather than appeal Mr. Hanks' sentence and order a transcript, this same Mr. Tway
provided Mr. Hanks with the falsely annotated court documents that cemented his client's belief
that he would be free in less than 30 years. And Mr. Hanks had no reason to know the sentence
construed as enduring his natural life until the Rule 35 order was filed a year later. Because yet
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another attorney filed Mr. Hanks' post-conviction relief too late, the Court never heard the
merits. Hanks, 121 Idaho at 153-55, 823 P.2d at 187-89.
Today, the real life Mr. Hanks could not present a starker contrast to a suave litigator
playing "fast and loose" with court procedural rules. Indeed, Mr. Hanks is a

man who

paces the tier mumbling to himself and is subjected to extortion and teasing by other inmates. 1 A
jail house lawyer (Steve Priest) assisted Mr. Hanks initiate the instant case. See R. 122-126;
130-141. Mr. Hanks is a simple man and a "hapless litigant [who has been unable to] even find
the right door" to challenge his sentence in a hostile "Kafkaesque" labyrinth of procedural bars.

See Schultz v. State, 159 Idaho 486,490, 362 P.3d 561, 565 (Ct. App. 2015) (Judge Schwartzman
specially concurring)
Society has a significant interest in a just outcome in criminal proceedings, especially one
that involves the forfeiture of a man's life. In fact, society might question the benefit of finality
where our bursting prisons are forced to divert increasing resources from rehabilitation to
geriatric care for inmates with life sentences of questionable constitutional validity.
Allowing one corrupt attorney's conduct to forever close justice's doors threatens, rather
than protects, the integrity of the judicial system. Mr. Hanks did not take inconsistent positions in
claiming the district court's "determinate" life term expired after 30 years and in arguing that a

Mr. Hanks' age, previous alcoholism and the length of his incarceration are evident from the
record- all facts that support an inference that Mr. Hanks faculties are in decline. Counsel's
elaboration with the specifics of Mr. Hanks' functioning is based on her personal observation and
interactions with Mr. Hanks and consultation with others with direct knowledge.
1
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sentence of his natural life was unconstitutional. Judicial estoppel does not apply in these
circumstances and the district court did not err in declining to apply the doctrine.

C.

This Court Should Construe the Ambiguity in the Record to Avoid an Eighth
Amendment Violation
The Eighth Amendment forbids extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the

crime. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003). Proportionality is considered according to
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society rather than
viewed less through a historical prism. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. at 469-70 (2012); Shanahan,
165 Idaho at 354, 445 P.3d at 163.
The state correctly notes that the constitutionality of Mr. Hanks' sentence is not directly
before the Court. However, in considering Mr. Hanks' claim, the unconstitutional nature of Mr.
Hanks' sentence further dictates that the absence of a transcript should not be held against Mr.
Hanks.
The state also argues Mr. Hanks' sentence is neither cruel nor unusual because the
kidnapping statute provides for a determinate life sentence and life without parole has only been
held unconstitutional for non homicide offenses in the case of juveniles. However, Mr. Hanks
was ineligible for the death penalty under Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008). And
as Miller establishes, the irrevocable nature of death in prison is being recognized as akin to the
death penalty. The practice scarcely exists in the rest of the World. Who s Really Sentenced To

Life Without Parole?: Searching For "Ugly Disproportionalities" In The American Criminal
Justice System, Wisconsin Law Review 2015:789
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Mr. Hanks' sentence, which has never been reviewed, is far more severe than other
sentences this Court has reviewed for kidnapping. See e.g. State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 428,
776 P.2d 424, 437 (1989) (upholding sentence of 5 years indeterminate on rape conviction and
probation for life on kidnapping conviction were not excessive in context of his rape of retarded

State v. Bagshaw, 137 Idaho 613, 617, 51 P.3d 427, 431 (Ct. App. 2002) (upholding
unified life sentences with 25 years determinate for robbery convictions, 25 year determinate
sentences for kidnapping convictions, and determinate 10 year sentence for burglary conviction);

State v. Weaver, 135 Idaho 5, 7, 13 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2000) (no abuse of discretion in sentence
to indeterminate life sentence with 15 years fixed for kidnapping); State v. Norton, 134 Idaho
875, 882, 11 P.3d 494, 501 (Ct. App. 2000) (affirming concurrent sentences of unified terms of
life, with minimum period of confinement of 3 5 years on rape conviction and a minimum period
of confinement of 25 years on first degree kidnapping conviction); State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho
800, 804, 992 P.2d 795, 799 (Ct. App. 1999) (maximum sentence of a determinate term of 40
years' imprisonment, including a 15-year enhancement for the use of a firearm in the commission
of a felony, was not excessive for a kidnapping); State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 121, 844 P.2d
1364, 1371 (Ct. App. 1992) (fixed sentence of 18 years for first-degree kidnapping was lawful);

State v. Lenwai, 122 Idaho 258, 261, 833 P.2d 116, 119 (Ct. App. 1992) (eight years for the
combined crimes of rape, burglary, kidnapping and the infamous crime against nature was not an
abuse of discretion); State v. Martinez, 122 Idaho 193, 195, 832 P.2d 764, 766 (Ct. App. 1992)
(upholding concurrent indeterminate life sentences with 20 years fixed for rape and forcible
sexual penetration with foreign object, and concurrent indeterminate 25-year sentence with

9

minimum term of 15 years for kidnapping in extremely odious and brutal circumstances); State v.

Dowalo, 122 Idaho 761, 765, 838 P.2d 890, 894 (Ct. App. 1992) (upholding fixed sentence of 18
years for first-degree kidnapping of young girl where defendant forcibly abducted young girl and
molested her); State v. Soto, 121 Idaho 53, 61, 822 P.2d 572, 580 (Ct. App. 1991) (sentence with
probable term of confinement of seven years for kidnapping

girl and assaulting her

with intent of committing lewd and lascivious act was well within statutory limits and was not
unreasonable or abuse of discretion even though defendant did not have criminal record and had
fairly stable family and work history); State v. Estes, 120 Idaho 953, 954-55, 821 P.2d 1008,
1009-10 (Ct. App. 1991) (upholding 15 year sentence imposed upon defendant convicted of
first-degree kidnapping of

boy) State v. Wolverton, 120 Idaho 559, 565, 817 P.2d

1083, 1089 (Ct. App. 1991) (upholding sentence to concurrent life terms plus 15 years, with
minimum of 25 years in prison, for each charge of rape, robbery, kidnapping, and use of a
firearm in the commission of those crimes was not excessively harsh); State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho
462, 465, 788 P.2d 863, 866 (Ct. App. 1990) (upholding concurrent unified sentences of 20 years
with 5 year minimum period of confinement for defendant who pled guilty to kidnapping and
raping

girl); State v. Burnham, 115 Idaho 730, 732, 769 P.2d 607, 609 (Ct. App.

1989) (minimum six-year periods of confinement for rape and kidnapping convictions was not
excessive); State v. Spurgeon, 107 Idaho 173, 175, 687 P.2d 17, 19 (Ct. App. 1984) (upholding
four concurrent sentences, each for an indeterminate term not to exceed 15 years, for two
robberies).
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Counsel located one case affirming a fixed life sentence for a kidnapping offense that did
not involve homicide -

a case involving first-degree kidnapping and lewd conduct with minor.

State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210,221,953 P.2d 650,661 (Ct. App. 1998); see also State v. Brown,
121 Idaho 385, 394, 825 P.2d 482,491 (1992) (defendant not only raped the victim but almost
killed her. Unlike the crimes Mr. Hanks committed during the kidnapping, lewd conduct and rape
carry a potential life sentence. Conversely, appellate courts have declined to uphold fixed
sentences in other cases not involving homicide. See State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 296, 939 P.
2d 1372, 1375 (1997) (reversing fixed life for lewd conduct with instruction to reduce
determinate term to fifteen years); State v. Helms, 143 Idaho 79, 83-84, 137 P.3d 466, 470-71
(Ct. App. 2006) (reversing fixed life for throwing toilet water at guard).
Death in prison bears many similarities to the death penalty and evolving decency
standards dictate that it be reserved for the most serious of offenses. Mr. Hanks -

now age

seventy six and having served thirty-six years in custody- has served more time for kidnapping
than could be imposed as consecutive, maximum penalties for the crimes he committed during
the kidnapping. This Court should construe ambiguities in the record in Mr. Hanks' favor to
avoid a result that if likely violates Eighth Amendment.

III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons state above and in Mr. Hanks' opening brief, this Court should
conclude the district court erred in finding no issue of material fact supported Mr. Hanks' claim
that his sentence expired and reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
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Respectfully submitted this 7th day of October 2019
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Attorney for Melvin Hanks
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